Purpose -this study aims to investigate how those directors of listed companies to make profits when their firms were listed to public.
owners usually control large percentage of shares before or after their firms going public. The second one is the first-day closing market prices usually are higher than the initial file price ranges, where the initial file price range is defined as the expected value per share by preissue shareholders just a few days before the IPO initially announced.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows, section 2 is literature reviews. Section 3 is data section and methodology, section 4 is the samples and empirical analysis, and conclusion is in section 5.
Literature review
The money was left on the table which is associated with the high initial return (the price change measured from the offering price to the market price on the first trading day) in IPOs of common stock. The existence of the high initial return phenomenon in IPOs is well known by the economic literature, and seems to be a common characteristic of most international markets, as highlighted by Loughran et al. (1994) .
Most of theoretical models explaining IPO important initial share three features: imperfect information and agency costs among firms, intermediates, and investors; choice and institutional setting of introduction procedure and; investors over-optimism in hot issue markets. Rock (1986) categorizes investors into two types: informed and uninformed. He gives the winner's curse hypothesis to explain the IPO underpricing. Benveniste and Spindt(1989) state that the underpricing is a means to induce informed investors to reveal private information about the demand for shares in the pre-selling phase, thus allowing the intermediates to better evaluate the offering. Ritter (1998) names Benveniste and Spinet's (1989) hypothesis as the market feedback hypothesis. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) , Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Welch (1989) and Chemmanur (1993) instead identify the firm's managers as the informed party , and interpret the underpricing as a " signal" of a firm's quality and as a meant of counter balance the costs borne by the investors in collecting information. Ritter (1998) states that, in order to generate excess demand and be able to have a large number of small shareholders, issuing firms intentionally underprice their shares. The disperse ownership will both increase the liquidity of the market for the stock it more difficult for outsiders to challenge management.
There also are several financial economists explain the relationship between directors' benefits and the money left on the table. Loughran and Ritter (2000) state entrepreneurs do not get upset about money left on the table. Trueman(2000) finds that gross profits are positively and significantly associated with stock price. Moreover, he also finds that the bottom-line net income positively associates with stock price for preissuers. Arosio, Giudici and Paleari (2000) point out those issuing directors rely on private information signalled by the revision of the final offer price, compared to the initial file range. The more optimistic the price revisions in prospectus range after book-building activity, the higher the initial return since issuing directors are provided with good news. Arosio et al. (2000) state the controlling shareholders after the IPOs discover they are wealthier, and this is good news for them. Miche and Ljungqvist (2000) argue that the owners can minimize their wealth loss during the IPO process by retaining a large number of shares. Miche (2000) points out that an issuer selling more shares clearly stands to lose more than an issuer selling fewer shares for a given level of underpricing.
Lahnerman and Tvershy (1979)) argue that issuers care about the change in their wealth rather than the level of wealth. Michel and Ljunqvist (2000) argue that owners care about underpricing to the extent that they stand to lose from it, and that any such losses are proportional to the number of primary (new) and secondary (old) shares being sold. Lioughran and Ritter (2002) stated that pre-issue shareholders sum the wealth loss from leaving money on the table with the wealth gain on the retained shares from a price jump, producing a net income in wealth for preissue shareholders. also argues that to avoid losing more money on the direct fee of underwriters, issuers like leaving money on the table. Ritter (2001) points out, in general, the wealth gain for preissue shareholder from the revaluation is greater than his or her share of the money left on the table. He also gives a formula for explaining the condition. The formula will be shown in the methodology section later.
Data selection and methodology
The main data in this research is collected from internet web site www.edgar-online.com. In this web site, we can access both the US and other international IPO markets. Because this study aims to investigate how those directors of listed companies to make profits when their leave money on the table, we believe which would be a market scenario rather than a special period phenomena; therefore, we just culled available market data for this study between 1990 and 2002. In the US IPO market, we only can find 62 listed companies provided how many or percentages of IPOs owned by director or executive shareholders before or after public listing between 1990 and May 2002 (see Table Two ). In other international IPO markets, there were 655 IPO details available in 61 countries up to June 2002 (see Table Three ); however, only 94 provided such details to public (see Table Four ) in the same period.
The methodology used in this research is basing on formula; following data selection criteria: the IPO should issue ordinary common shares and should not be a unit offering, closed-end fund, real estate investment trust (REIT) or an American Depository Receipt (ADR); the IPO should have an offer price of at least $8.
Ritter (2001) points out, in general, the wealth gain for preissue shareholder ( i) from the revaluation is greater than his or her share of the money left on the table, when the following condition is met: {Shares retained (i) + secondary shares sold (i)} * (OP -midpoint) + shares retained (i) *{P-OP} › {P -OP} {Secondary shares sold (i) + primary shares sold * (shares retained (i) / shares retained)} where P is the market price, OP is the offer price, primary shares sold are being sold by the firm, secondary shares sold(i) are existing shares being sold by shareholders(i), and the shares retained without a subscript are for all shareholders combined (see Barry (1989) for related work ). For issuers with an upward revision of the offer price (upward revision means the offer price is above the initial file price range; midpoint is the middle of the initial file price ranges), this condition will be met unless shareholder (i) is selling a large number of shares in the offering or the offering is huge relative to the preissue number of shares. In practice, young companies going public rarely have any secondary shares in the IPO.
It is clear that Ritter's model is based on the situation that offer prices are higher than initial file price range (upward revision). Ritter (2002) Actually, this new formula is same as Ritter's. But in this study, we do not pay attention to the relationship between the offer price and initial file price range; we focus on the relationship between the first-day market closing price and the initial file price range. P, OP and i have the same meaning as Ritter's.
Due to the formula, the condition only can happen if (i) the market price (the first day closing price) is below the midpoint and ;( ii) shareholder only retains a little number of shares before or after IPO process. Because young companies going public rarely have any secondary of shares in IPOs ], so the most important factors in the formula are shares retained and [P-midpoint]. Issuing directors only can get benefits from money left on the table when they hold large number of shares and P-midpoint is positive.
The empirical analysis
Let's take the example of Netscape's IPO, where director Clark held 9.34 million shares. Based on the midpoint of the file price range of $12-$14, the expected value of his Netscape holdings was $121 million at the time that the preliminary prospectus was filed. At the closing market price on the first day of trading, his shares were worth $ 544 million, a 350% increase in his pre-tax wealth in the course of a few weeks. So at the same time that he discovered that he had been diluted more than necessary due to the large amount of money left on the table, he discovered that his wealth had increased by hundreds of millions of dollars. Since he owned 28.2% of the company before going public, $43 million of the $151 million wealth transfer from preissue shareholders to new investors come out of his pocket. Although he lost $34 million, his gain is more than his loss. He got both news at the same time, bad news is that he lost some money on the Table Five shows the relationship between offer price, the file price ranges and first day closing market price for IPOs. The data is got randomly from www.edgar.online.com, the fourth column, the first closing market price come from Ritter (2001) . From the 24 random samples, except of CONE ( its market price is lower than file price range), other 23 firms' first day closing market prices all are higher than midpoint, so we argue that in IPOs that left money on the table, the first closing market prices commonly are higher than file price ranges. It is clear that the first-day market closing price minus the midpoint (the middle of initial file price range) usually is positive, which means that P-midpoint is great than zero.
Although Arosio et al. (2000) , Miche and Ljungqvist (2000) and Ritter (200) all believe that directors can get benefits from money left on the table in IPOs with shares controlling, none of them gives the evidence that the preissue shareholders retain a large number of shares before or after firms going public.
From Table Two , we can see that in the USA IPO market, the board of directors, on average, hold 62.25% of their equities prior to going public; after going public, the board of directors still control large percent of shares, average 40.71%. Table Four exhibits the percentage of shares that are held by the board of directors in international IPO market, among the 94 firms, before going public, the directors, on average, own 54.63% equities of the companies; after going public, these directors still own about 45.29 percent of shares.
From Tables Two and Four , it is clear that the preissue shareholders (issuing directors) always hold huge number or large percentage of shares either before or after their firms going public. So the second factor, issuing directors retain a large number of shares before or after firms going public, is absolutely prevailing in IPO markets around the world. Now, considering the formula, the directors always hold large number of shares before or after going public; the market price usually is higher than the file price range. Due to the both factors, the directors will get the high net benefit from the money left on the table. The greater the percentage of stock owned by top managers, the more likely they will make decision consistent with maximizing stockholders' wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976), since that will ultimately maximize their own wealth.
We give another example , July 2000, Corvis company went to public, the offer price is $36.00, the first day closing market price is $84.72, the file price range is between $13-$15.The directors group own 148,549,248 shares,49.4%, prior to going public. The total issue shares are 31,625,000. The price of IPO jumped $48.72 per share. The expected values of their holding shares are $2,079.69 million at the time the preliminary prospectus was filed (midpoint price * number of shares they hold, $14 *148.549 m= $ 2,079.69m). At the closing market price on the first day of trading, their shares' value increase to $12,585 million ($84.72 *148.549 m). This is $10,505million increase in their pre-tax wealth in the course in a few weeks. Although the directors left large amount money on the From the above two examples, it is clear that when directors own large percent of shares prior or after going public; and the market price is higher than the midpoint (the middle price of the file price range), they will get the benefit from the money left on the table. The both factors are important for increasing their wealth in the IPO process. finds that there are huge amount of money was left on the table during the IPO process. He also finds that the preissue shareholders do not get upset about money left on the table and they can get benefit from the money left on the table. From the formula that was established by , we find that Ritter bases his theory on the upward revision (the offer price is higher than the initial file price range).Because there are not many IPOs' offer prices are higher than initial file price ranges (only about 24.3%) ], so we develop Ritter's formula. In this new formula, we focus on the relationship between the first-day market closing price and the initial file price ranges rather than the relationship between offer price and the initial file price range. Depending on the new formula, we believe that the issuing directors get benefits from the money left on the table have to depend on two factors: they should hold a large number of shares before or after their firms going public; the first-day market closing prices must be higher than the initial file price ranges. We analysis the data from the United States and international IPO markets and find the most of IPOs' first-day market closing prices are higher than the midpoint (the middle price of the initial file price ranges). And before or after firms going public, the issuing directors always hold large number of shares of their own firms. So that, the pre-issue shareholders (issuing directors) usually do not worry about the money left on the table, they can get benefit from the money left on the table depend on the shares retaining and the higher first-day market prices. This research provides a clear picture to help investors better understand primary market particular IPO market. The findings of this research may be used for future academic research literatures which focus on IPO or primary market. ISSN 1913 -9004 E-ISSN 1913 48 Welch, I and Ritter, J. (2002) . A review of IPO activity, pricing and allocations working paper, Yale ICF. The data is from the web site www.edgar-online.com , update 31 st May 2002. In each firm's report, only the shareholders who own more than 5 % of the total shares will be listed. All directors and executive officers are treated as a group. 45.29% The data is from web site www.edgar-online.com , in the international IPO performance, there are 61 countries and areas are listed on the web site. Among the 655 IPOs, only 94 firms exhibit their conditions of shareholders, prior or after going public. The firms only list the shareholder who owns more than 5 percent of shares, the directors and executive officers are treated as one group. 
Conclusion.

